agreement in writing with the assistance of the mediator(s) . How ever, the resulting agreement is usually not enforceable by outside parties, so that its effectiveness is dependent on the parties' com mitment to future cooperation.
Arbitration, the most formal and binding means of resolving conflicts, short of standard administrative and legal remedies, is generally used among parties whose ties are marginal or highly specific. Arbitration is often specified as the first or exclusive method of dispute resolution by administrative agencies or contract ing parties. The most common instances of its use are in labor management and landlord-tenant disputes. The parties appear before a professional arbitrator who has the authority, after hearing all relevant evidence on their claims, to issue a decision which is enforceable but is subject to appeal.
Contrasting Views of Conflict : Three Perspectives
Drawing on the growing literature concerning dispute resolution, mostly written by persons trained in law rather than planning, I have identified three fundamental theories of social order, conflict, and change which offer substantially different underlying interpreta tions of recent efforts to address planning-related conflicts in a more innovative and responsive manner.
The lega list view is based on the premise that society is ordered, and conflict is largely aberrational. Because the legalist approach is concerned w ith maintenance of order and consensus, it stresses means of diffusing disputes and minimizing differences which are consistent with established procedures and require minimal non routine effort. I The legalist approach carries particular judgments about the significance of conflict and the way in which it should be addressed. Disputes are generally perceived as discrete acts or events which deviate from external norms presumed to be valid. This concept of conflict tends to isolate claims from the social context in which they arise. It presumes that agencies' primary or exclusive function is to objectively "settle" apparent differences between parties, not to address underlying issues relevant to the immediate conflict. 2 -Implicit in the legalist approach is the view that disputes are essentially dysfunctional and localized. Stability is considered to be the norm. Systems are designed to eliminate deviance, suppress conflict and reaffirm social integrity through efficient "resolution" of specific disputes. 3
In urban neighborhoods, this order maintenance fu nction usually falls to the police, whose responsibil ity is to "dissolve" rather than solve community problems. 4 Similarly, planners often assume roles which require them to ignore or minimize the meaning of social differences and conflicts in their work. The standard scope of Environmental Impact Report review, for example, may preclude examination of elements in a development proposal which are likely to create difficulties later, e.g., housing needs; reuse of the plant in the event of closure.
Forums fo r rece1vmg c1t1zen comment, e.g. in the Community Development Block Grant program , are often organized to most expeditiously satisfy external fu nding sources rather than meaning fu lly involve residents in program and policy decisions, thereby overlooking or obscuring points of dissent within the community.
The doctrine of "rational" intervention, especially as applied to physical planning, shares many legalist assumptions. The classic planning model posits a disinterested professional who acts largely as a technical intermediary -assessing pertinent data, evaluating outcomes of a limited range of alternatives and presenting analyses which will expedite action. This planning paradigm, promoted as a means of fa cilitating efficient and objective decision-making, fails to address salient issues beyond the purview of paid staff, including implementation problems and those posed by alternatives not fo r mally advanced.
The expressionist perspective offers a critique of the ways in which legalist institutions (whether they be grounded in law, planning or other fields) suppress and manipulate conflict. Those who hold this viewpoint believe (a) that conflict is integral to both individual and community development and (b) it should, therefore, be ack nowledged, even encouraged. Otherwise, they reason, people will fa il to learn from their encounters with others and become frus trated in their efforts to understand and act on common concerns. 5 Expressionists claim that cultures of greater diversity or stress pay a particularly high price for conflict-avoidance. They envision dispute resolution as a means of confronting, understanding and attempting to accomodate differences which (when misperceived or misdirected) produce alienation and injury. This view assumes that most people, if given the choice and sufficient support, will prefer to seek a reconciliation with others rather than remain in conflict or withdraw dissatisfied. 6 Whereas the legalist view assumes that individuals are typically able to withdraw from conflicts or resolve them in ways which are mutually satisfactory, 7 expressionism suggests that people in conflict have limited and non-optimal options due to institutional constraints and economic or social pressures to which they are sub ject.
This critical theory supports proposals for new fo rums more responsive to individuals' concerns and to the quality of their environment. Reforms in citizen participation illustrate expression ist tendencies within planning practice. Measures requiring plan ning agencies to issue public announcements and information, to submit certain draft reports, such as EIR's, for public review, and to assess public response in program evaluation are supported by those who see the planning process as both interactive and educa tional, i.e. as a vehicle through which contrasting interests in a given community may face one another, address unmet needs and social priorities, influence public policy and thereby contribute to more cohesive and inclusive community development.
The trend toward more active public involvement in development planning appears to be based on these expectations as well as in a practical interest in forging, through compromise, a strong con sensus which will enhance overall planning. By encouraging more open deliberation and adopting development stipulations that are more responsive to local conditions, planners aim to reduce public opposition to proposed projects. The negotiation of development agreements offers new opportunities for soliciting and utilizing pub lic comments and proposals.
Advocates of such reforms generally share the legalist commit ment to a stable and ordered society. They argue that more partici patory and pluralist mechanisms should be developed to adapt to increasingly diverse and disruptive urban environments. Their implicit aim is to repair the social fabric within these communities, rather than raise issues of power or resource inequality which may exist between these groups or areas and the larger society. How ever, proponents of extreme expressionism abandon the concern for social stability, claiming that conflict has primary value for indi viduals independent of any institutional resolution and it should not necessarily be controlled or mitigated. 8 The transformationist view differs from the two preceding perspec tives in its attention to collective conflict and the implications-of power inequalities for the disputing process. Theorists of this view offer a useful critique of the assumption (prominent in contem porary reform circles) that efforts should be concentrated on immediate and tangible disputes between parties who have some direct relationship, e.g., neighbors; family members; criminal and victim; consumer and business manager. These critics claim that such a definition of disputing wrongly equates social conflicts with more or less routine matters and fails to acknowledge or address far deeper and more important grievances, e.g. intergroup or class ten sions within the society. 9 They also contend that conventional rationales for mediated set tlements fail to take into account that one party may have sufficient leverage over others to preclude meaningful negotiation, or that the intervention of a third party necessarily alters the relative position of other parties. IO For example, a planning staff might decide to arrange a meeting between a developer and a citizen group with concerns about a proposed project. It is unlikely that the citizen group will be able to substantially alter this proposal since the developer typically has established site control and has advanced a specific development plan with the aid of hired consultants. By comparison, the citizen's group rarely has either direct property interests or the resources to develop a detailed, feasible alternative. Since the planner/mediator is normally expected by superiors to act quickly and do what is possible to facilitate development, it is prob able that the citizens' group will be unable to do more than obtai n minor modifications of the proposal before them, unless they are exceptionally expert and well-organized. A mediator, like a judge, will often evaluate a dispute on the basis of perceived community opinion or self-interest, even though this may result in an expedient decision that comes at the expense of one or all parties involved. 11
The principles of advocacy planning are generally consistent with the transformationist rationale fo r more autonomous, participatory , equitable and comprehensive mediation forums. Proponents of the few local dispute resolution programs which fu nction independently of the courts or other public agencies suggest that these programs' development of participants' understanding, skill and organizational strength is more critical than their impact in discrete situations much as advocacy planners viewed the significance of poorer neigh borhoods' struggles to change controversial redevelopment policies in the late 1960's and early 1970's.
Similarly, the expectation by some that more open and balanced community-based fo rums fo r addressing salient social tensions can become catalysts in a broader movement for a redistribution of pol itical power and economic resources l 2 is akin to that held by advo cacy planners, though the latter were more inclined to use confron tational tactics to counter the leverage of their institutional antagon ists, than to bargain with more influential parties. Indeed, there is a tension between organizing and negotiating strategies, as the latter may tend to diffuse popular resistance through protracted, incon clusive discussions and reduce legitimacy and leverage of commun ity leaders in the process.
Social and Political Constraints in Informal Dispute Resolution
The relevance of social conditions and status differences to the disputing process suggests that introduction of these reforms among diverse populations ought to be responsive to the differing positions and values of individuals, groups, and cultures. The success of informal fo rums in relatively simple or closed communities, for example, is often attributable to the high cost of avoidance (loss of reciprocity) or the presence of a defined and respected hierarchy. In contrast, more fragmented and mobile urban environments are generally associated with weaker communal authority and tend to undercut the effectiveness of those dispute-resolution approaches which rely on a sense of interdependence and collective identity. I3
Differences among norms of residents and · non-residents or among member groups of a community complicate the search for shared interests on which the resolution of conflict depends. Those living in a given area may tolerate what others consider illegal or inappropriate activities, such as commercial uses in residential dis tricts, noise in public places, or inconsistent building design. They might, therefore, interpret imposition of alien standards by planners or other authorities negatively, even if these are introduced indirectly via negotiation rather than by jiar. I4 Such friction is based on real differences in resources, not simply misperception. Minority groups or viewpoints are usually not given equal weight, however well represented or whatever their merit, because of the dominance of other groups in the community. Con versely, certain conditions may permit a powerful minority to exert inordinate influence in the context of negotiations. A principal employer, for instance, might extract significant concessions from leaders of an economically dependent population. In other cases, a small but articulate and well-organized interest group, such as residents opposed to public housing or increased zoning densities, is able to block projects or policies which would benefit those less influential in the local power structure.
The relative power of the parties will influence their response to conflict. Less powerful parties tend to "lump it", i.e. endure the costs of an unresolved dispute, because a successful resolution appears unlikely, while dominant parties choose to ignore grievances against them 15.
Courts : More Equitable and Efficient than the Alternatives ?
Lacking a fo rum for informal reconciliation of their differences or preferring not to use those available, disputants often seek adminis trative or judicial remedies. Their resort to external authority and an adversarial process is frequently inefficient insofar as it imposes additional burdens on the parties, impedes discussion between them and heightens rather than diffuses tensions. In planning contexts, the personal and social costs of resulting fiscal and development impasses have wasted limited resources, polarized constituencies and spurred support for more cooperative approaches that might achieve more productive outcomes.
However, informal and voluntary approaches can be successfully applied only to a limited range of problems and issues as the fo re going analysis indicates. In cases where one party has decidedly more leverage than others, it will be difficult to obtain the fu ll cooperation of that party or arrive at an equitable settlement. An additional concern, voiced most strongly by transformationist pro ponents of class action remedies, is that mediation may prove to be a patchwork and individualized solution despite its appeal, coopting broader claims which are properly legal or political . For example, a company sensitive to publicity of damage caused other property owners will likely prefer to negotiate semiprivately with individual complainants than fa ce greater scrutiny from regulatory agencies. I & One defense of courts' role in the settlement of such conflicts is that they can provide weaker parties with more equitable relief than can be generally obtained via mediation, since they have the requisite authority to compel participation and performance by a stronger party who would otherwise not cooperate or make conces sions. 1 7 The evolution of small claims courts in the United States illus trates some of the central contradictions evident m the contemporary shift toward decentralized dispute resolution forums. The major objective in establishing these courts was to consolidate cases which were considered relatively simple and to expedite pro cessing of these. Rapid processing, however, tended to favor more powerful parties (typically creditors seeking judgments against deb tors) and preclude fu ll hearings of what were commonly quite com plex disputes. Judicial oversight, justified by claims that extra judicial forums would deny parties due process, established uniform and traditional procedures in small claims cases which undermined the intent of reformers to provide a more open and conciliatory context for settling ordinary grievances. I S
Control and Consistency in the Administration of Dispute Reso lution
Approximately fifty years after small claims courts were intro duced, a similar debate has arisen over whether decentralization of dispute resolution fu nctions should be independent of established legal and governing institutions. Conflicting opinions on this ques tion can be traced to fu ndamentally divergent views of the new fo rums' strategic position and purpose within the larger society.
Those who take the legalist stance see these fo rums as a means of more efficient service delivery to disputants with low-order prob lems. They argue that mediation should be standardized and insti tutionalized to expedite processing and reduce associated costs. Expressionist and transformationist critics contend that this legalist rationale serves the administrative prerogatives of central authori ties and the interests of certain immediate parties, while neglecting the needs and capacities of others involved, as well as related social networks. They, therefore, propose that mediation fo rums be administered principally by laypersons from the community or staff accountable to residents, rather than by court personnel or other agency professionals l9 .
Others propose that the new fo rums overcome the internal con tradiction of small claims courts by clearly distinguishing fo rmal from informal fu nctions. 20 For exampe, conciliation or structured mediation might be appropriate for preliminary discussions among conflicting sides in a local or regional development controversy, while more fo rmal arbitration methods would probably be needed to prepare a legally binding development agreement. The movement toward community-sponsored (as opposed to institutionally-developed) dispute resolution programs is based largely on populist conceptions of autonomy and cultural change. Proponents of citizen involvement in the mediation of planning related disputes believe that participation can provide a stimulus for community revitalization. By relying on themselves rather than on external authorities and successfully addressing local problems, however specific, residents gain the skills and confidence requisite for sustaining viable communities. 2 1 Democratization of police and planning fu nctions is envisioned as residents assume greater responsibility for short-term problem-solving and longer-range pol icy making. 22 However, these innovative programs most often deliver services without advancing an integrated theory of citizen empowerment and social change, leading some critics to advocate intervention in larger issues such as resource inequalities among groups and communi ties. 23 Transformationist critics reason that without an implicit understanding of the underlying causes of social conflict, local pro grams tend to reinforce defensive, oppressive or divisive forms of "community" rather than challenging ingrown prejudice and privilege. Other community development theorists justify a localist programmatic emphasis as a means of overcoming host communi ties' political and economic dependency, fo llowing the logic advanced by proponents of ghetto development. 24 Those who share the transformationist or advocacy perspective theorize that the long-term survival of community-based mediation fo rums will require a more explicitly political strategy. Because they have been modest in their goals and capacities to date, these programs have been largely tolerated by established institutions. Yet they will come into conflict with courts and public agencies as they expand their purview to larger issues of governance. To secure necessary legitimacy and fu nding, programs will have to mobilize widespread support fo r the fu ndamental goals of decentral ized, democratic decision-making.
Another scenario for the evolution of such programs casts the State in a more central and manipulative role. Officials may respond to demands fo r reform by granting citizens limited oppor tunities fo r participation without extending any significant degree of control over the planning and regulatory process. 25 Under the guise of decentralization , courts and public agencies-supported by those whom such empowerment threatens-could create subordi nate units to expand their influence at the local level. "Little city halls" and similar neighborhood-scale projects, it is argued, have been designed to reaffirm existing hierarchies despite promises of reconstituting public authority.
Less centralized or fo rmal means of reconciling community interests present planners with several challenges. How narrowly are planning issues to be defined fo r the purposes of debate ? Which parties may participate? How much leverage and responsibil ity will parties have in making, authorizing or implementing deci sions which result from deliberations? What degree of consensus justifies administrative recommendations and action? The fo rego ing analysis suggests that the assumptions and objectives (implicit or explicit) of those who develop and institutionalize planning pro cess reforms of this kind will shape the answers to these questions.
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